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Application to the Educational
Decision of Ivorian Households
N’da Koffi Christan
Abstract
Faced with unlimited needs, the scarcity of resources forces economic agents to
make choices. The analysis using discrete choice models aims to identify the bases
of these decisions. The aim here is to highlight the explanatory factors of the
demand for education by Ivorian households for their children. To do this, the
simple logit model is applied to explain the decision of schooling children. Then the
multinomial logit model is used to explain the continuation of education. Household
living standard survey data of 1998 and 2008 are used. It shows that age, household
composition, and the provision of primary and secondary education services have a
positive influence on the education of children. Income influences only high school
education. The effects of sociodemographic factors vary by region. Security and
accessibility of administrative services encourage the education of children.
Keywords: logit, multinomial logit, education, human capital, decision
1. Introduction
Through education, the individual acquires a set of general or specific knowl-
edge or know-how that is determinant in the production process. The knowledge
accumulation is an important source of economic growth [1, 2]. It slows the rate of
change to the steady state by mitigating the effects of diminishing returns on
physical capital accumulation. This leads to a positive long-term growth rate since
the accumulation of knowledge is proportional to the stock of existing knowledge.
In addition, the stock of knowledge affects a country’s ability to innovate (see [3]).
Education determines the employee’s ability to perform tasks and allows them to
integrate technology and/or the environment of technological innovation.
Côte d’Ivoire has made training one of its priorities as soon as it attains inde-
pendence with an education-training sector budget of about 40% of the general
state budget [4]. The aim was to generalize primary education and ensure the
growth and development of secondary and higher education. But, the successive
crises of the 1980s will slow down this momentum. At the end of the structural
adjustment program (SAP), the state undertook to reinvigorate education policy by
adopting a new legal framework that makes education the means by which all
individuals integrate socially, culturally, and professionally and exercise their
citizenship (Art. 1, Law No. 95-696 of 7/09/1995).
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The private sector participates in the provision of education in all three levels of
formal education. For the years 2010–2011 and 2011–2012, it trained, respectively,
14.17 and 12.26% of primary students, 32.06 and 43.27% of lower secondary general
education, 32.23 and 44.74% of upper secondary general education, and 60.41% of
learners in technical and vocational education. However, this public-private collab-
oration did not achieve the goal of Education for All in 2015 [5].
Therefore, it seems of interest to seek to understand the fundamentals of the
education decision of the Ivorian households. We are looking for ways to ensure
that all children are able to attend school and complete the educational process by
studying the basis of the demand for education in order to highlight the determi-
nants of household choice, considering three main categories of actors: the house-
hold, the child, and the public authorities.
For individuals, investing in education provides economic and social returns. It
increases both employment rates and labor income. But, education requires the
learner’s full involvement in the training process, hence the importance of time in
the cost of training [6]. However, the possibilities of accumulation of knowledge
depend on the physical and intellectual capacities of the individual, supposed to
decrease with the age of the individual.
It has been proven that the sources of motivation for studies must be sought in
the financial benefits of education and competition in the labor market [7] so that
the duration of studies is positively correlated with the level of remuneration of
work. This makes it possible to cover the costs of the years of study. Also, the more
or less strong mobility of the productive factors which characterizes the generalized
liberalization of the markets makes that the labor market becomes more and more
competitive. The labor market is also a market where very often the sectors or
branches of activity (segments) require specific knowledge. As a result, mobility
between industries requires additional investment in education. Moreover, the
personalization of the training constitutes a natural protection against the risks of
appropriation by others. The effectiveness of this protection increases the incentive
to invest in oneself [6]. But this customization limits external funding opportunities
for investment in education.
Investment in education also serves social purposes [8]. Some works on the
determinants of differences in levels of life in various long-term economies have
reignited the debate about endogenous growth theory, empirical growth analysis,
and convergence (i.e., [2, 9–11]). Education plays a key role in countries’ ability
to innovate [4]. And investment in education follows logic of maximization of
utility [12].
Moreover, integrations of the intergenerational transfers required in the expla-
nation of the education decision show that the lack of a market to finance educa-
tional investment makes young people captive to parental funding [13]. This in turn
forces them to pay back to their parents the highest possible share of their activity
income.
From a macroeconomic point of view, public intervention is important to main-
tain their labor force as unemployed, given the costs associated with this mainte-
nance [14]. But such a selective and discriminatory policy may discourage the
individual interview of their skills by all the unemployed. One advocated a gener-
alized credit system that allows young people to study and reimburse fees when
they are active (i.e., [15]). Otherwise, the level of education will be zero. Therefore,
the public supply of education aims to correct this failure of the financing system
and encourage the expression of a latent demand for education [16].
In sum, the demand for education is motivated by factors related to individual
and collective social well-being. It is in this sense that the state sometimes sub-
stitutes itself to the market to generating the expression of a latent demand thanks
2
Education Systems Around the World
to the public policy of education. The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 gives an overview of discrete choice models, and then the method of
analysis and the data that will be used for the empirical analysis of the determinants
of education are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results and discusses
them. Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the study.
2. The discrete choice models
In a decision-making process, it is a question of finding the best solution among
the possible alternatives to satisfy the objectives. The decision can be continuous
choice or discrete choice. In the first case, it amounts to choosing a combination of
the quantity of possible alternatives where the quantities for each alternative can
vary continuously. With the second option, it is a question of choosing only one
alternative among several alternatives. We present in this section first the theoret-
ical foundations of discrete choice models and then the mathematical formulas of
the multinomial logit model.
2.1 Theoretical basis of discrete choice models
Suppose the consumer can compare all possible alternatives. There is a utility
function U that expresses consumer preferences. Let Cn be the set of alternatives
available to the n decision-makers during the decision process, where Ui is the
utility of the decision-maker associated with the alternative i; the utility function
can be defined in terms of attributes as follows:
Ui ¼ U Zið Þ (1)
where Zi is the vector of the attributes for the alternative i. Thus, for the
decision-maker n, the alternative i is chosen if and only if
Ui ≻Uj j 6¼ i, i, j∈Cn (2)
In fact, when repeating the same choice test, or with the same set of choices, the
same attributes, and the same socioeconomic characteristics, different individuals
will choose different alternatives. The theory of probabilistic choice explains this
inconsistency of the preferences of individuals. It is assumed that human behavior
is intrinsically probabilistic or that more specific information about the individual
decision-making process is lacking. The probabilistic mechanism can capture the
effects of unobservable variations among decision-makers and the unobservable
attributes of alternatives. It also considers the stochastic behavior and the error
caused by the method of data collection.
Thus, the probabilistic characteristics of the choice decision make it possible to
highlight the alternative that a decision-maker will choose in the decision-making
process by calculating the probability that a decision-maker will choose the alter-
native. The hypothesis of the agent’s rationality always assumes that individuals
select alternatives with the highest utility. The probability that a decision-maker
selects the alternative i will be that the utility of this alternative i is greater than that
of the other alternatives:
Pi ¼ Pi Ui ≻Uj; ∀j 6¼ i
 
(3)
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Since the utilities are not known for certain, they must be treated as random
variables by decomposing the random utility function of a two-part alternative:
Ui ¼ Vi þ εi (4)
Since each agent has a set of choices designated by Cn, with j≺J as the number of
choices (alternatives), the probability that the alternative i in Cn is chosen can be
rewritten as
P ið Þ ¼ P V i þ εi ≥V j þ εj; ∀j∈Cn; j 6¼ i
 
¼ P εj ≤V i  V j þ εi; ∀j∈Cn; j 6¼ i
  (5)
where Vi denotes the systematic component of utility and εi refers to the random
component of utility.
The determination of the model specification depends on the choice of the form
of the utility function. This specification concerns the systematic component which
is supposed to be a linear function on the parameters (acronym for “linear in
parameters”). Let β, the vector of k unknown parameters, be the linear function on
the parameters written as
V i ¼ β1Xi1 þ β2Xi2 þ…þ βkXik (6)
In the equation above, the parameters β1, β2, and βk are assumed to be the same
for all. But in reality, the socioeconomic characteristics are not identical for all
agents. The parameters must not be fixed and must instead be variable according to
the different characteristics of the individuals. This problem can be solved by
treating the parameter β as a random variable that follows a probabilistic
distribution.
Moreover, assuming that the chosen alternative i is the first alternative in Cn and
f εi; ε2;…; εj
 
that the joint density function of the error terms is designated, the
probability can be written in the form
P 1ð Þ ¼
ð∞
ε1¼∞
dε1n
ðV1V2þε1
ε2¼∞
dε2…
ðV1V jþε1
εj¼∞
f ε1;…εj
 
dεj (7)
The density function of the error terms εj depends on the correlation between
these error terms. Correlations internal to the observations are the correlations
between the residues relative to the different alternatives for the same individual. In
this case, for every individual, we have Eεjε
0
j ¼ ∑n, and∑n is no longer a diagonal
matrix. By making assumptions about the joint probabilistic distribution of the
error terms εj, any multinomial choice model can be deduced. In the following, only
the multinomial logit model and the logit model with random parameters will be
processed.
2.2 Logit multinomial model
If one assumes that they are independently and identically distributed (IID),
hypothesis equivalent to the hypothesis independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA), and that what follows them is a distribution of Gumbel, one obtains the
multinomial logit model (MNL model):
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P ið Þ ¼ exp V j
 
∑j∈Cn exp V j
  (8)
If the utility function is linear on the parameters, the model is written as
P ið Þ ¼ exp β
0
Xi
 
∑j∈Cn exp β
0
Xj
  (9)
where Xi is explanatory variables representing the socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics of individuals, their environment, or contextual characteris-
tics and β is the parameters to estimate.
2.3 Logit model with random parameters
In the logit model, βk is constant (set for all individuals) and therefore cannot
capture the effects of individual characteristics. To remove this constraint, we
assume that βk is a random variable of specific or normal distribution. In this case,
the probability of choice can be written in the following form:
P ið Þ ¼
ð∞
∞
ð∞
∞
…
ð∞
∞
P
0
ið Þf βk;…; β1ð Þdβk…dβ1 (10)
where f β1;…; βkð Þ is the density function of the parameters of the individual
utility function
with P
0
ið Þ ¼ exp β
0
Xi
 
∑j∈C exp β
0
Xj
  (11)
For example, if C is the cost of education, T is the duration of education, and X is
the other explanatory variables, the linear utility function is written as
Ui ¼ βcCi þ βTTi þ α
0
Xi þ εi (12)
Assuming, moreover, that the coefficient of the duration of education βT takes a
random value [17], of the normal type, the function of the probabilistic density βT is
written as
f βTð Þ ¼
1
σβT
ffiffiffiffiffi
2π
p exp  1
2
βT  ω
σ
 2" #
with βT ≻0 (13)
In this case, the probability of choice can be written as follows:
P ið Þ ¼ 1
σ
ffiffiffiffiffi
2π
p
ð∞
0
exp βcCi þ βTTi þ αXið Þ
∑
J
j¼1
exp βcCj þ βTTj þ αXj
  ∗ 1βT 
1
2
βT  ω
σ
 2" #
dβT (14)
Although this model is also based on the hypothesis IIA, the fact that the coeffi-
cients of the attributes can vary among the individuals improves the specification of
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the logit model. In the next section, the multinomial logit model will be applied to
Ivorian data to explain the choice of Ivorian households in education.
3. The household education decision
This section presents the theoretical framework and method of analysis as well
as the data sources for empirical applications.
3.1 Theoretical framework of the analysis model
The economic agent who invests in training expects a return higher than the cost
of his investment in terms of labor compensation. Thus, a methodology is devel-
oped from gain functions (see [18–21]). Starting from Becker’s models of education
(see [22–24]), the demand for education can be modeled from the utility function
of the household. Let us consider a model of choice of inter-temporal education
where the representative household has only one child and lives two periods (i.e.,
[25]). The household derives its utility from the consumption of goods and services
(C) and the cognitive skills of its child (A). In period 1, the child may be in school,
work, or both. In the latter case, the child goes to school first and works after school
[26]. The utility function of the household can then be written as
U ¼ C1 þ δC2 þ σA (15)
where δ is the discount factor of future consumption and σ represents parents’
preferences for child-rearing. Children’s education can increase parental consump-
tion. It also directly affects the usefulness of parents. The acquisition of cognitive
skills can be expressed using a production function as follows:
A ¼ αf Qð Þg Sð Þ (16)
where α is the child’s learning efficiency that encompasses a number of factors,
such as the child’s learning abilities and motivation and the parents’ ability to
support their child in school work, Q is the quality of the school, and S is the grade.
The parents’ consumption in each period is expressed as follows:
C1 ¼ Y1  pSþ 1 Sð ÞkYc (17)
C2 ¼ Y2 þ kYc (18)
where p is the price of education and Y1 and Y2 are the income of parents at
periods 1 and 2. Yc is the child’s income when working and the share of that income
paid to parents. 1-S is the time the child devotes to work. Income is completely
exhausted at the end of each period. The household does not go into debt either.
Children’s income can be modeled on cognitive skills:
Yc ¼ πA (19)
where π is the productivity of cognitive skills in the labor market.
Substituting Eq. (16) in Eq. (19), Eq. (19) in Eqs. (17) and (18), and
Eqs. (16)–(18) in Eq. (15), the utility function of parents is written as a function of
years of schooling and the quality of the school:
U ¼ Y1  p0Sþ δY2 þ 1 Sþ δð Þkπ þ σ½ αf Qð Þg Sð Þ (20)
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If the quality of the school is considered exogenous, then the variable that
determines the choice is the time of education (S). The optimal duration of educa-
tion is obtained by maximizing the utility function of the household. But, parents
have the opportunity to also choose the quality of the school they want for their
child. Thus, the price of education will depend on the quality of the school:
p ¼ p0Q (21)
where p0 is the basic price of education. By replacing p by p0Q in Eq. (6), we
obtain the expression of the utility function to be maximized according to the
quality variables (Q) and the study time (S):
U ¼ Y1  p0QSþ δY2 þ 1 Sþ δð Þkπ þ σ½ αf Qð Þg Sð Þ (22)
To simplify derivation calculations, one postulates that the quality function of
the school and the duration of education have the following functional forms (see
[27]): f Qð Þ ¼ Qβ and g Sð Þ ¼ Sγ with β>0; γ>0. One can then write the functional
form of the utility function of the parents as being equal to
U ¼ Y1  p0QSþ δY2 þ 1 Sþ δð Þkπ þ σ½ αQβSγ (23)
Maximizing the utility function of parents following S and Q determines the
optimal values of the length of education and the quality of the school:
S ∗ ¼ γ  βð Þ 1þ δþ
σ
kπ
 
1þ γ  βð Þ (24)
S ∗ is positive if and only if γ  βð Þ≥0. The sensitivity of cognitive skills to
learning times must be greater than the sensitivity of cognitive skills to the quality
of the school. Eq. (24) suggests that parents’ preferences for education and future
consumption have a positive influence on the length of their child’s education. But
when the share of his income that the child has to give back to his parents increases
less he makes long studies. Also, a high productivity of cognitive skills in the labor
market will encourage the child to opt for work earlier than education:
Q ∗ ¼ αβkπ
p0
 γ1 1þ δþ σkπ 
1þ γ  β
 γ
(25)
From Eq. (25), we conclude that the child’s learning abilities, preferences for
future consumption, and parents’ level of education are positively related to the
quality of children’s education. On the other hand, the basic price of education
negatively influences the quality of education that parents are willing to choose for
their child.
The level of knowledge acquisition is determined by integrating Eqs. (24) and
(25) into the cognitive skill acquisition equation. The production of cognitive skills
can be expressed in a linear form for the sake of simplification [25]. The functional
form of this production function is
A ¼ μ0 þ μ1Sþ μ2αþ μ3Q þ ε (26)
The parameter μ is the vector of the coefficients to be estimated and ε the error
term which captures the measurement errors of the variables Q, S and α. The qual-
ity of the school differs according to the type of school. Also, learning efficiency is
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also a multidimensional notion and can be influenced by several factors. The equa-
tion of acquisition of cognitive skills can then be rewritten in the form
A ¼ μ0 þ μ1Sþ ρ1α1 þ ρ2α2 þ…þ ρnαn þ τ1Q1 þ τ2Q2 þ…þ τnQn þ ε (27)
The level of knowledge can be validly equated with the level of education. As a
result, the level of education is explained by a set of variables relating to the school,
its quality and its environment, the child, the parents, and the socioeconomic
context.
3.2 Econometric analysis model
The empirical application of the educational demand model will be done using a
multinomial qualitative variable model as in the study for the analysis of the
demand for education in rural areas of Benin (see [28]). We first estimate the
probability of being schooled using a logit model in which the variable of interest is
a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the child is enrolled and 0 if not:
logit Enrol ¼ 1½  ¼ Φ XIβð Þ (28)
where Xi is a vector capturing the individual, family, and community character-
istics that can influence the probability of a child going to school, β is the vector of
unknown parameters to estimate, and Ф (.) is the normal cumulative distribution
function. It is therefore necessary to estimate the probability of being educated
conditionally to the explanatory variables transformed by the distribution function;
P Y ¼ 1ΙXð Þ ¼ β0 þ βiXi þ βmXm þ βrXr þ ε (29)
where
Xi ¼ the individual characteristics of the child
Xm ¼ socio‐economic and demographic characteristics of the household
Xr ¼ the characteristics of the place of residence of the household and the child
ε ¼ term of error
8>>><
>>>:
In a second step, we estimate a multinomial model to capture the explanatory
factors of the continuation of school life once children are enrolled:
mlogit School ¼ k½  ¼ Φ XIβð Þ (30)
with k = 1, 2, and 3 corresponding, respectively, to primary, first, and second
cycles of secondary school. It is a question of estimating the function
Uik ¼ Xiβk þ εik where εik is an independent random variable and the individual
characteristics of the child, those of the household, and the place of residence. The
probability of choosing a category k is given by
P Y i ¼ kð Þ ¼ exp Xiβkð Þ
∑K
k
0¼1 exp Xiβk0
	 
 (31)
Household living standard survey data (ENV98 and ENV2008) will be used for
applications. They provide information on the characteristics of households, their
members, and their living environment. Each individual is attached to a household
whose demographic structure and socioeconomic context are well-known.
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4. Empirical evaluations
We analyze the probability of being schooled using a binary logit model. Then
we apply the multinomial logit to grasp the explanatory factors of the continuation
of studies in the secondary cycle. The estimation technique is the maximum
likelihood.
4.1 Factors explaining the school decision
The analysis of the determinants of schooling will be conducted according to
individual characteristics, family determinants, and contextual elements (Table 1).
We also calculate odds ratios (Table 2) and marginal effects (Table 3).
4.1.1 Individual determinants
The age of the child, his sex, and the relationship to the head of the household
are the characteristics considered. Their influence on schooling has evolved over
time. The age of the children acts positively in favor of schooling with an inverted
U-shaped evolution as the age increases. The age thus has an inverted U-shaped
effect on the education decision, thus joining the education decision in Benin [28].
Young boys are more likely to be in school. This confirms findings of other study
taking account West African counties [29]. Girls are discriminated for schooling in
some West African countries, including Côte d’Ivoire. It should be noted, however,
that in 2008, the individual characteristics of the child were less important in his
schooling than in 1998. His health status was of greater concern to his parents when
it came to sending him to school.
4.1.2 Family determinants
Sociodemographic determinants such as household size and number of adults in
the household have significant effects on children’s schooling. In 1998, there was a
positive correlation between the number of adults in a family and the schooling of
children in that family. In 2008, the number of children under 5 is positively
correlated with the school decision. But, the number of adults in the household
discourages schooling. In addition, the number of educated adults in the household
encourages the education of children. Children in a single-parent household are less
likely than those in a couple to be in school.
The responsibility for educational expenses is not a barrier to schooling for
children. However, parents with a primary level are not very favorable to schooling
their children, while those who have not been to school are motivated to send their
children to school. The socio-professional category of parent influences the educa-
tion decision with greater for public employees compared to private sector
employees and farmers.
4.1.3 The contextual elements
Membership in a social organization and the supply of education encourage
the schooling of children. Membership in the association therefore has positive
externalities on the probability of raising children. Also, bringing education supply
to households encourages parents to send their children to school. In 2008, this
influence of educational provision was reinforced by the availability of secondary
education institutions in the region or department. When the nearest security office
9
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ENV1998 ENV2008
Enroll Coef. z Enroll Coef. z
Individual determinants
Age 0.4497** 2.23 Age 0.0255 0.46
age2 0.0435*** 5.41 age2 0.0048 1.67
child_hh 0.1733 0.80 ChilGen 0.7186*** 6.98
ChilGen 0.7404*** 4.79 lchild11hh 0.0173 0.41
lchil12.15hh 0.3506** 7.24
lchil16.18hh 0.1219** 2.43
SickDur 0.2689*** 2.85
Family determinants x
Size_h 0.5694*** 5.62 Size_h 0.1203 1.31
Sexhh 0.21101 0.84 Sexhh 0.9466*** 5.75
SPC 0.0138 0.42 SPC 0.0942** 2.17
non_ed_parh 0.3623*** 3.56 matStahh 0.9453*** 6.70
Paredh 0.3267*** 3.45 Edupar 0.0354 0.44
child_5h 0.2926*** 2.87 child_5 0.3388** 2.30
Mal19_59h 0.3285*** 3.40 fem19_59 0.3755*** 3.31
fem19_59h 0.3611*** 4.06 male19_59 0.3406*** 3.29
adult60h 0.3148** 2.08 adult60 0.3118* 1.69
An_rev_hh 2.96e-09 0.72 Revenu 3.44e-08 1.61
Respedh 0.7403*** 10.27 Scolm 0.21892* 1.78
Scolh 0.2018*** 4.65 Child 0.5492*** 3.34
Migrant 0.8082 1.33 Migrant 0.0108 1.20
Resid 0.2481 1.23
Contextual determinants
Associat 0.3741** 2.00 Associat 0.0628 0.47
Region 0.0212 0.27 coges_ape 1.5506*** 8.71
GdRegion 0.0381 1.22 Pu_sch 1.3742*** 14.55
Infracom 0.0878 0.46 Pr_sch 1.2302*** 13.17
Transp 0.0945 0.57 Ip_sch 0.0557 0.24
PPSh 0.7569*** 9.61 Is_sch 0.0847 0.33
Gen_sch_hh 0.1892* 1.79 Admin 0.0284 0.20
_cons 2.1982 1.61 Securit 0.0152 0.06
Infracom 5.33e-08 0.50
D_infocom1 0.0920 0.67
D_infocom 0.2719*** 3.85
D_adm0 0.1731*** 3.17
D_adm1 0.2103*** 4.99
D_adm 0.0324* 1.84
D_securit1 0.0181 0.11
10
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is located more than 5 km from the residence, parents are less motivated to enroll
their children in school [30]. The presence of the administration acts positively on
the schooling.
4.1.4 Odds ratios
The odds ratios allow appreciating the influence of the independent variables on
the dependent variable in terms of percentage but are not elasticities. The difference
between the displayed value and the unit gives the weight of this influence and its
meaning (see Table 2).
In 1998, age acted positively on the school decision in more than 56% of cases.
Gender is the determining factor in the child’s own characteristics with a comparative
advantage for young boys. The main determinant of schooling in 2008 is the state of
health of the child. The marital status of the head of household and the presence of
administrative services strongly contributed to the schooling of children in 2008. The
number of children under 5 is crucial for more than 40% of cases. The presence of
adults frees children and increases their chance of attending school by more than 50%
in 1998. On the other hand, the influence of the number of educated adults in the
household is smaller than that of the number of adults even if it is positive. But 2008,
the number of educated people in the household is an essential lever for schooling.
The supply of education and the responsibility for school expenses determine
the decision to go to school in more than 80% of cases. The endowment of commu-
nication infrastructures greatly increases the probability of being in school.
4.1.5 Marginal effects
The marginal effects let us to assess the impact of the independent variables on the
dependent variable (see Table 3). For example, in 1998, when the size of the house-
hold increased by 10%, the motivation to enroll children dropped by 2%. The proba-
bility of going to school increases by 2% from a girl to a boy. Also, the parents’
membership of an association increases by 1.5% the chance of the children to be
educated. In addition, the 10% increase in the supply of primary education increases
ENV1998 ENV2008
Enroll Coef. z Enroll Coef. z
D_securit 0.2295* 1.94
D_prim 1.3031*** 9.24
D_second1 0.3276 0.99
D_second 0.6560*** 3.43
_cons 1.7753*** 3.53
Number of observations = 3321
LR chi2(25) = 1701.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.5727
Log likelihood = 634.85088
Number of observations = 3892
LR chi2(39) = 1444.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.4142
Log likelihood = 1021.9515
*Significance at the threshold of 10%
**Significance at the threshold of 5%.
***Significance at the threshold of 1%.
Source: Author using data from ENV98 and ENV2008.
Table 1.
Results of the binary regression of the probability of schooling.
11
Discrete Choice Model: An Application to the Educational Decision of Ivorian Households
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.87433
ENV1998 ENV2008
Enroll Odds ratios z Enroll Odds ratios z
Individual determinants
Age 1.5678** 2.23 Age 0.9748 0.50
age2 0.9575*** 5.41 age2 0.9952* 1.80
child_hh 0.8409 0.80 ChilGen 0.4874*** 9.46
ChilGen 2.0967*** 4.79 lchild11hh 0.9828 0.54
lchil12.15hh 0.7042*** 9.52
lchil16.18hh 0.8852*** 3.31
SickDur 1.3086*** 2.92
Family determinants
Size_h 0.5659*** 5.62 Size_h 1.1279* 1.91
Sexhh 1.2349 0.84 Sexhh 0.3881*** 6.58
SPC 0.9863 0.42 SPC 0.9101** 2.30
non_ed_parh 1.4366*** 3.56 matStahh 2.5736*** 6.57
Paredh 0.7213*** 3.45 Edupar 0.9652 0.39
child_5h 1.3399*** 2.87 child_5 1.4033*** 2.88
Mal19_59h 1.3889*** 3.40 fem19_59 0.6869*** 3.91
fem19_59h 1.4349*** 4.06 male19_59 0.7114*** 3.96
adult60h 1.3700** 2.08 adult60 0.7322* 1.83
An_rev_hh 1.0000 0.72 Revenu 1.0000 1.53
Respedh 2.0966*** 10.27 Scolm 1.2447 1.35
Scolh 1.2236*** 4.65 Child 1.7318*** 3.64
Migrant 0.4457 1.33 Migrant 1.0101 1.07
Resid 1.2816 1.23
Contextual determinants
Associat 1.4537** 2.00 Associat 0.9391 0.47
Region 0.9790 0.27 coges_ape 4.7142*** 10.45
GdRegion 1.0389 1.22 Pu_sch 3.9519*** 18.04
Infracom 1.0918 0.46 Pr_sch 3.4219*** 13.85
Transp 1.0992 0.57 Ip_sch 0.9458 0.21
PPSh 2.1316*** 9.61 Is_sch 1.0883 0.34
Gen_sch_hh 1.2083* 1.79 Admin 1.0288 0.20
_cons 9.0084 1.61 Securit 0.9849 0.06
Infracom 0.9999 0.73
D_infocom1 0.9121 0.75
D_infocom 1.3124*** 3.91
D_adm0 0.8411*** 3.33
D_adm1 0.8104*** 4.63
D_adm 1.0329 1.59
D_securit1 1.0183 0.12
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enrollment by almost 3%, compared with 7% points for supply of secondary educa-
tion. The presence of a secondary school in the locality increases by 0,21% the
probability of being educated against 0,09% for the administration. Being a direct
descendant of the household head increases the chance of being in school.
In 2008, a 10% increase in the number of children in the household led to a 3%
increase in the probability of being in school. Similarly, the increase in the number
of children under 5 by 10% increases the chances of attending school by 1.9%. This
influence is 5.3% when moving from a single-parent household to a couple. A 10%
increase, respectively, in public and private education offers increases the proba-
bility of attending school by 7.7 and 6.9%. The existence of a COGES improves this
probability by 7.48%. In contrast, an additional adult in the household reduces the
probability of attending school by 2.11 or 1.92% depending on whether a woman or
a man is between 19 and 59 years old.
An extension of 1 km of distance to the nearest administration causes a decrease
of 1.18% in the probability of being in school compared to 1.29% for the security
services and 10.67% for the primary school against not more than 3.7% for the
secondary establishment.
4.2 Determinants of the continuation of educational life in the secondary cycle
The analysis of the determinants of the pursuit of education follows the same
logic as that of the explanatory factors of schooling (Table 4).
4.2.1 Individual determinants
In 1998, the age of the child is the only significant individual variable for
continuing high school education. Younger children are much more likely to go to
high school. This is in line with the findings of the case study on Benin [28] that the
likelihood of continuing education declines as the child approaches the end of
childhood.
In 2008, it is rather the relationship with the head of household that becomes
determinant for secondary school. Also, a significant number of children of primary
ENV1998 ENV2008
Enroll Odds ratios z Enroll Odds ratios z
D_securit 0.7950** 2.25
D_prim 0.2717*** 9.06
D_second1 0.7206 1.01
D_second 0.5189*** 3.77
_cons 5.9018*** 3.38
Number of observations = 3321
LR chi2(25) = 1701.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.5727
Log likelihood = 634.85088
Number of observations = 3892
LR chi2(39) = 1444.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.4142
Log likelihood = 1021.9515
*Significance at the threshold of 10%
**Significance at the threshold of 5%.
***Significance at the threshold of 1%.
Source: Author using data from ENV98 and ENV2008.
Table 2.
The odds ratios.
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1998: y = Pr(enroll) (predict) = 0.9606 2008: y = Pr(enroll) (predict) = 0.9400
Variables dy/dx z Variables dy/dx z
Individual
Age 0.0170** 1.98 Age 0.0014 0.50
age2 0.0016*** 4.10 age2 0.0003* 1.77
child_hh 0.0066 0.83 ChilGen 0.0405*** 9.14
ChilGen* 0.0297*** 4.41 lchild11hh 0.0010 0.54
lchil12.15hh 0.0198*** 8.69
lchil16.18hh 0.0069*** 3.24
SickDur 0.0152*** 2.92
Family
Size_h 0.0215*** 4.68 Size_h 0.0067842* 1.90
Sexhh 0.0080 0.87 Sexhh 0.0534*** 6.63
SPC 0.0005 0.44 SPC 0.0053** 2.28
non_ed_parh 0.0137*** 3.24 matStahh 0.0533*** 6.17
Paredh 0.0123**** 3.27 Edupar 0.0020 0.39
child_5h 0.0111** 2.59 child_5 0.0191*** 2.87
Mal19_59h 0.0124*** 3.36 fem19_59 0.0212*** 3.90
fem19_59h 0.0137*** 3.93 male19_59 0.0192*** 3.92
adult60h 0.0119** 2.15 adult60 0.0176* 1.83
An_rev_hh 1.12e-10 0.88 Revenu 1.94e-09 1.54
Respedh 0.0280*** 8.76 Scolm 0.0123 1.35
Scolh 0.0076*** 4.24 Child* 0.0317*** 3.53
Migrant* 0.0434 0.84 Migrant 0.0006 1.08
resid 0.0094 1.21
Contextual
associat* 0.0157* 1.71 associat* 0.0036 0.47
region 0.0008 0.27 coges_ape* 0.0748*** 10.20
GdRegion 0.0014 1.25 Pu_Sch 0.07748*** 15.46
infracom* 0.0032 0.47 Pr_Sch 0.0694*** 12.20
transp* 0.0036 0.57 Ip_Sch* 0.0032 0.21
PPSh 0.0286*** 8.18 Is_Sch* 0.0046 0.35
Gen_sch_hh 0.0072* 1.70 admin* 0.0016 0.20
securit* 0.0009 0.06
info_com 3.00e-09 0.73
D_infocom1 0.0052 0.75
D_infocom 0.0153*** 3.88
D_adm0 0.0098*** 3.30
D_adm1 0.0118*** 4.53
D_adm 0.0018 1.59
D_securit1 0.0010 0.12
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school and primary school age have a negative effect on entry to secondary school.
On the other hand, a large number of children of upper secondary age who are
directly related to the head of household increases the chances of attending second-
ary school. The first may serve as a guide or framer to the latter. This increases their
“learning efficiency” (see [25]) and reduces the cost of education related to
repetition. Good health is also important for high school.
4.2.2 Family characteristics
The number of adults in the household is inversely related to the continuation of
secondary education. In addition, children of couples are more likely to have a full
secondary education compared to single-parent families.
In 1998, residency status had a positive effect on secondary education, and
migrant status had a negative influence. On the other hand, in 2008, migrations were
positively correlated with secondary education. In our database, the main reasons
declared to justify the migration of populations are related to education, professional
reasons, and the crisis. Most of the displaced pupils have returned to school in their
new places of residence thanks to certain facilities (relay school), hence the strong
correlation between internal displacement and secondary education in 2008.
In addition, the increase in household size negatively influences children’s
chances of attending secondary school. On the other hand, the increase in house-
hold income has a very positive impact on the continuation of secondary education.
4.2.3 The contextual elements
Populations in the western forest region and in the central and northern savan-
nah regions are those whose offspring are less likely to be in high school compared
to families in the Abidjan region. The high labor demand for field work in these cash
crop production areas may explain the fact that children over 12 years of age are
removed from school to assist in plantations. Also, migration flows from central and
northern populations to forest areas reduce the available labor force in the departure
areas. Thus, the greatest children are regularly asked for the cultivation of the fields.
The fact that parents belong to an association or a union increases children’s
chance for secondary education in 1998. On the other hand, in 2008, associative
activism (union, COGES, etc.) discourages further education in secondary educa-
tion. In fact, the often high level of contributions in these associations is in compe-
tition with educational expenditure. This reduces the shares of income devoted to
1998: y = Pr(enroll) (predict) = 0.9606 2008: y = Pr(enroll) (predict) = 0.9400
Variables dy/dx z Variables dy/dx z
D_securitt 0.0129** 2.24
D_prim* 0.1062*** 6.48
D_second1* 0.0210 0.90
D_second 0.0370*** 3.79
*Significance at the threshold of 10%. dy/dx is for dummy variable changes from 0 to 1 for discrete variables.
**Significance at the threshold of 5%.
***Significance at the threshold of 1%.
Source: Author using data from ENV98 and ENV2008.
Table 3.
The marginal effects of exogenous variables on the probability of schooling.
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ENV1998 ENV2008
School Coef. z School Coef. z
Non-educated
Individual determinants
Age 0.5810*** 2.96 Age 0.0174 0.40
age2 0.0496*** 6.22 age2 0.0016 0.69
child_hh 0.0495 0.25 ChilGen 0.0416 0.66
ChilGen 0.7483*** 5.15 lchild11hh 0.0095 0.34
lchil12.15hh 0.1867*** 5.61
lchil16.18hh 0.5134*** 14.43
SickDur 0.4265*** 5.75
Family determinants
Size_h 0.6085*** 5.65 Size_h 0.0061 0.10
Sexhh 0.2162 0.95 Sexhh 0.2879** 2.23
SPC 0.0032 0.10 SPC 0.0338 0.95
non_ed_parh 0.3864*** 3.69 matStahh 0.7316*** 4.50
Paredh 0.2948*** 3.14 Edupar 0.0704 0.92
child_5h 0.3904*** 3.62 child_5 0.1221 1.26
Mal19_59h 0.3511*** 4.06 fem19_59 0.3342*** 3.76
fem19_59h 0.4244*** 5.00 male19_59 0.0262 0.32
adult60h 0.3922*** 2.76 adult60 0.31547** 2.12
An_rev_hh 9.69e-11 0.03 Revenu 3.17e-08** 2.17
Respedh 0.7886*** 11.99 Scolm 0.5934*** 3.58
Scolh 0.1817*** 4.42 Child 0.5354*** 4.15
Migrant 0.6688 1.05 Migrant 0.0385*** 4.73
Resid 0.2304 1.21
Contextual determinants
Associat 0.3258* 1.74 associat 0.5917*** 4.88
Regions coges_ape 0.3105*** 2.72
Other cities 0.0931 0.41 Pu_Sch 1.089*** 16.86
Forest East 0.1325 0.46 Pr_Sch 0.5735*** 7.93
Forest west.t 0.0074 0.03 Ip_Sch 0.1013 0.46
Savannah 0.0730 0.21 Is_Sch 0.0280 0.13
GdRegion 0.0226 0.69 admin 0.0857 0.71
infracom 0.0322 0.19 securit 0.2033 0.86
Transp 0.0599 0.38 infracom 1.11e-08 0.15
PPSh 0.7175*** 10.54 D_infocom1 0.0748 0.75
Gen_sch_hh 0.3734*** 3.13 D_infocom 0.1631*** 3.51
_cons 1.1867 0.92 D_adm0 0.1401*** 3.07
D_adm1 0.1295*** 3.53
D_adm 0.0820*** 4.72
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ENV1998 ENV2008
School Coef. z School Coef. z
D_securit1 0.2020 1.60
D_securit 0.1211 1.54
D_prim 1.2777*** 10.33
D_second1 0.6889*** 3.09
D_second 0.2969** 2.06
_cons 0.1052 0.21
Prim_School Basis line
Second_School
Individual determinants
Age 1.6447*** 2.70 Age 0.071788 1.49
age2 0.0222 1.06 age2 0.005174** 2.09
child_hh 0.1549 0.83 ChilGen 0.1177127* 1.81
gendchil 0.1433 0.99 lchild11hh 0.1111*** 4.01
lchil12.15hh 0.0496 1.58
lchil16.18hh 0.4325*** 12.78
SickDur 0.0910 1.09
Family determinants
Size_h 0.0064 0.07 Size_h 0.1583*** 3.04
Sexhh 0.0898 0.40 Sexhh 0.4011*** 2.94
SPC 0.0284 0.74 SPC 0.0137 0.38
non_ed_parh 0.1008 1.07 matStahh 0.2796 1.54
Paredh 0.1421 1.56 Edupar 0.1152 1.63
child_5h 0.0131 0.14 child_5 0.0066 0.07
Mal19_59h 0.3441*** 4.02 fem19_59 0.0019 0.02
fem19_59h 0.1421* 1.69 male19_59 0.1347* 1.83
adult60h 0.1203 0.83 adult60 0.8167*** 5.83
An_rev_hh 5.82e-09* 1.83 Revenu 6.29e-08*** 4.36
Respedh 0.0204 0.61 Scolm 0.0435 0.29
Scolh 1.3133* 1.89 Child 0.5782*** 4.12
Migrant 0.3394 1.64 Migrant 0.0654*** 7.80
Resid 0.8711*** 10.52
Contextual determinants
Associat 0.16534 1.03 associat 0.2192* 1.69
Regions: coges_ape 0.5885*** 4.59
autres villes 0.3615 1.57 Pu_Sch 0.2840*** 5.24
Forêt Est 0.7284** 2.23 Pv_Sch 0.37748*** 5.93
Forêt Ouest 0.7140** 2.34 Ip_Sch 0.0013 0.01
Savane 0.8853** 2.11 Is_Sch 0.0202 0.09
GdRegion 0.0381 1.07 admin 0.0370 0.28
17
Discrete Choice Model: An Application to the Educational Decision of Ivorian Households
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.87433
education hence the inverse relationship between belonging to an association and
the chances of going to secondary school in 2008.
Also, the presence of secondary schools is beneficial for the continuity of studies.
This positive relationship between the supply of education and the probability of
attending secondary school is reinforced by the presence of communication infra-
structures and the reduction of distances to the first educational, security, and
administrative infrastructure (see [30]).
5. Conclusion
This study aims to elucidate the factors that underlie the decision of households
to invest in the education of their children from the Ivorian case. It is an application
of the multinomial logit model using data from the living standards surveys of 1998
and 2008.
The findings show that in Côte d’Ivoire the age of the children, composition of
the household, as well as education supply (the probability of being able to go to
secondary school combined with the proximity of primary schools) are the factors
that motivate parents to enroll their children in primary school. For the continua-
tion of studies at the secondary level, the level of income is very decisive.
Sociodemographic factors also play a very important role, such as the size and
ENV1998 ENV2008
School Coef. z School Coef. z
infracom 0.2844 1.40 securit 0.5716** 2.39
Transp 0.2222 1.40 infracom 1.81e-07*** 2.71
EPPm 0.2190*** 3.18 D_infocom1 0.4196*** 2.82
Ets_gén_pcm 0.6429*** 7.52 D_infocom 0.1293*** 3.12
_cons 19.6011*** 4.41 D_adm0 0.0525 1.09
D_adm1 0.1611*** 3.61
D_adm 0.0913*** 5.19
D_securit1 0.1474 0.92
D_securit 0.1244 1.45
D_prim 1.1673*** 7.97
D_second1 0.2504 1.21
D_second 1.4441*** 9.24
_cons 1.9054*** 3.55
Number of observations = 4055
Wald chi2(56) = 1179.88
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.5862
Pseudo log likelihood = 1408.2873
Number of observations = 3964
LR chi2(78) = 2605.07
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.3473
Pseudo log likelihood = 2447.6977
*Significance at the threshold of 10%
**Significance at the threshold of 5%.
***Significance at the threshold of 1%.
Source: Author using data from ENV98 and ENV2008.
Table 4.
Results of multinomial regressions.
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composition of the household as well as the sex of the head of the household and the
type of household. Also, children entering high school are more likely to continue
their studies. However, from one region to another, disparities can be observed
according to the sex of the child and the socio-professional category of the head of
the household.
Bridging the security services encourages education mostly secondary despite
the distance to the nearest school. The presence of the administration or its bringing
together of citizens and the development of communication and transport infra-
structures reinforce the attractiveness of the school in Côte d’Ivoire. However, some
school management structures, such as COGES, tend to reduce school life,
especially at the secondary level.
In addition, considering the endogenous quality of education provision will
make the results of the study more robust. To do this, it is necessary to gather
information on the characteristics of the educational offer, particularly the number
of pupils per teaching, the actual execution of the school curriculum, the provision
of teaching materials for training structures, etc. Also, considering the decision-
making mechanism within households makes it possible to better identify the
sociodemographic factors that influence the decision to educate households. The
availability of information on the above variables is an extension of this study.
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